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Abstract: The 2008 Global Financial Crisis has come and gone. Since then, worldwide interest 
rates remain at an all-time low, yet economic growth remains sluggish. Theories have been put 
forward to explain the phenomena, two of which take a secular perspective, detached from the 
recent crisis.  This paper employs an explorative style of examining two historical datasets with 
the staging point of the real interest rate levels, making it one of the more extensive overlooks 
of the real rate in both time and amount of countries. This paper finds that while the current 
period of low interest rates is neither exceptional in terms of length or severity, it stands unique 
in some regards. Notably, past episodes of low real interest rates have almost always coincided 
with significant increases in the rate of inflation, while the current bout of low real rates is 
occurring amidst lower than average rates of inflation. Even so, in many countries investment 
has weakened, savings has increased and policy rates were lowered to their limits since the 
crisis, all of which would contribute to lower real interest rates even in the absence of inflation. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, by many economists called the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, has come and gone. During its wake, the crisis, manifested as a liquidity 
crisis, threatened the collapse of large financial institutions which had to be bailed out to prevent 
financial collapse. Even so, worldwide stock markets dropped, consumer wealth decreased 
dramatically, and the crisis sparked a downturn in economic activity that some now call the 
Great Recession. 
The crisis and the accompanying recession was met with vigorous crisis management and 
stabilization policy efforts by governments as well as central banks. Fiscal and monetary policy 
were both used to stem the economic downturn. For many countries conventional monetary 
was deployed to its fullest, with policy interest rates set at or just above the Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB). 
Since then, worldwide interest rates remain at their all-time low. In the US, the Federal 
Reserve’s Funds rate has been hovering just above the ZLB for seven years straight now since 
the outburst of the Great Recession. In Europe several central banks, including the ECB, have 
recently set policy rates that are even below zero. Others, like the Bank of England, still hover 
close to the ZLB like in the US. Yet despite of this, economic recovery following the Great 
Recession has been sluggish in both the US and the Euro-area. 
The phenomenon has hardly gone unnoticed by so well economists, economic commentators 
as well as journalists. “NEVER in recent economic history have interest rates been so low for 
so many for so long.” (The Economist 2013) A recent BIS report (BIS 2015) echoes this and 
further adds that: 
“Interest rates have never been so low for so long. They are low in nominal 
and real (inflation-adjusted) terms and low against any benchmark. 
[…]Policy rates are even lower than at the peak of the Great Financial Crisis 
in both nominal and real terms. And in real terms they have now been 
negative for even longer than during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Yet, 
exceptional as this situation may be, many expect it to continue.” 
The report seeks to explain that the low rates are, at least partly, this low because they’ve been 
too low in the past. “Low rates begets lower rates still” they argue, essentially making the case 
that the interest rates are kept low because of the weak economic performance since crisis. 
Among other theories put forward to explain the low interest rates, two of the more prominent 
ones: the global savings glut hypothesis put forward by Ben Bernanke - and the secular 
stagnation hypothesis reintroduced by Larry Summers share common ground: they seek to trace 
the low interest rates to a mismatch in desired saving over desired investment. They 
interestingly also both adopt a secular viewpoint and explain the low rates as the result of longer 
run factors, detached from the latest crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is to add to the current dialogue on the topic of the low interest rates 
that are being experienced worldwide as of late. Because the two prominent theories advocate 
long-term structural changes in the world economy as the cause of the changes in the interest 
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rates rather than ultimately caused by the latest crisis, it would lend them credibility if there 
were to exist some historical precedent. 
The research question asked is: “do the current period of low interest rates share any common 
attributes with previous episodes of low interest rates in the past, or is it unique to our times?” 
This paper investigates whether or not there exists some pattern to previous occurrences of low 
interest rates and how the recent episode compares. Further it attempts to clarify whether the 
recent low rates can be attributed to low investment demand or excess savings, and whether or 
not the crisis has played a part. 
To do this, this essay employs an explorative style of examining two historical datasets, a “long” 
set which includes data extending back to the late 19th century for 12 countries, as well as a 
“wide” data set that contains more recent data for the same as well as an additional 12 countries 
for a total of 24 countries, all from the OECD. The staging point for the examination will be 
the real interest rate levels. 
This paper finds that while the current period of low interest rates is neither exceptional in terms 
of length or severity and that it shares a number of attributes with past periods of low interest 
rates, it stands unique in some regards as well. Notably, past episodes of low real interest rates 
have almost always coincided with significant increases in the rate of inflation, while the current 
bout of low real rates is occurring amidst lower than average rates of inflation. Even so, in many 
countries investment has weakened, savings has increased and policy rates were lowered to 
their limits since the crisis, all of which would contribute to lower real interest rates even in the 
absence of inflation. 
This paper only considers the long-term real interest rate, calculated as ex post government 
bond yields minus yearly CPI inflation. The use of long-term interest data primarily reflects the 
availability of such data. 
This essay is structured in the following manner: The next section will contain a theoretical 
framework on interest rates and will then review literature on two recent theories brought to 
light recently with regards to low interest rate levels, the secular stagnation and savings glut 
hypotheses. Section 3 will discuss the data used. Section 4 will then present the main findings 
and Section 5 will contain any conclusions drawn from the findings in relation to theory. 
2. Theory 
This section is organized as follows: after a brief literature review of the effects of low interest 
rates, we will then general theory on the formation of real interest rates. This is then followed 
by brief summaries of the secular stagnation and savings glut hypotheses as well as a discussion 
on the policy implications of both theories. 
2.1. The decreasing interest rates and their effect on the economy 
There seems to be little doubt that interest rates now are the lowest they’ve been in recent 
memory. Following the global financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve set its fund rate at 
virtually zero as part of its monetary policy crisis management. Seven years later and the rate 
still remains locked in place. 
3 
 
In Europe, several central banks, including the European Central Bank, the Danish 
Nationalbank, the Swiss National Bank and the Swedish Riksbank, have recently pushed short-
term interest rates below zero, ranging from negative 0.2 to as low as negative 0.75 percent. 
The reasons for the banks lowering of their policy rates differ slightly. In Switzerland and 
Denmark both their currencies were pegged to the Euro and the move to negative policy rates 
aimed to stop capital inflows and reduce the appreciation pressure on the natural currencies (In 
the Swiss case the peg was abandoned in early 2015. In the case of the ECB and the Swedish 
Riksbank, both having flexible exchange regimes, the negative policy rates were intended to 
provide additional monetary room to safeguard price stability. (McAndrews 2015) 
However, the recent low interest rates do not seem to be entirely the victim of recent 
circumstance or appearing (wholly) as a result the financial crisis. Even before the crisis, 
interest rates in the US as well as rest of the world had been noted as “unexpectedly low”, 
something Alan Greenspan (2005) referred to as a “conundrum”. Several authors have noted 
that interest rates seem to have been declining overall for decades now (see for instance 
Bernanke 2015a, Catão and Mackenzie 2006, Eichengreen (2015)) as part of a long trend. 
Merryn King and David Low (2014), in estimating a “world interest rate”, find that it has been 
decreasing steadily since 1985. 
Looking further back than most and considering the very long run are Eichengreen (2015) as 
well as Catão and Mackenzie (2006), considering data as far back as 1870 or even 1800. They 
find that when compared over a period as long as this the current levels of interest rates appear 
less exceptional. Catão and Mackenzie (2006) note that interest rates may appear very low now 
from the vantage point of the 1980’s or 1990’s but less so when compared to earlier periods. 
Moreover, the case of long-term interest rates being below the economy’s growth rate is also 
not as exceptional in the historical long run. (Catão and Mackenzie 2006) Rather, as 
Eichengreen (2015) points out, it may be that the period of high interest rates preceding the 
1980’s is the more anomalous one and that the decline in interest rates since then rather 
represents a “mean reversion” (Eichengreen 2015) 
Having low interest rates come with a set of economic effects and consequences. The main 
benefit of low interest rates is that it is commonly held to stimulate economic activity. This is 
the basis for conventional monetary policy, to lean against wind during economic fluctuations. 
By lowering the interest rate, the price of borrowing becomes cheaper and business activity 
spurs, which can help to alleviate a recession. Similarly by raising interest rates, economic 
activity is dampened and can help prevent the economy overheating.  Low interest rates may 
also affect asset prices. When interest rates are low, alternative measures to store wealth become 
more attractive all else equal. Increased demand for assets like housing or equities will then 
raise prices. 
There are several potential costs associated with very low interest rates including risk of higher 
inflation. Low interest rates penalizes savers and those who rely heavily on interest income. If 
real returns become low, investors will begin to seek out higher yielding assets including more 
speculative activities, potentially increasing financial instability. It may be that banks and other 
financial institutions tend to take greater risks when rates are kept at low levels for extended 
periods of time. It may also lead to overinvestment in long-term assets, which will be prone to 
price falls should the interest rate suddenly increase again. (Kliesen 2010) 
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The BIS 85th annual report warns that “ultra-low” interest rates, that might be negative in real 
or even nominal terms, can cause serious mayhem on a financial system. They sap banks’ 
interest margins and returns from maturity transformation, potentially weakening credit supply. 
They can undermine the profitability and solvency of insurance companies and pensions funds. 
But they also provide risk for the real economy, as the plight of pension funds may weaken 
aggregate demand. Also, negative interest rates are “hardly conducive to rational investment 
decisions and hence sustained growth” (BIS 2015) 
Also, when long-term rates are this is low, borrowing becomes very cheap, and governments 
may feel incentivized to address budgetary or economic issues by increased borrowing rather 
than imposing structural change. (BIS 2015) 
2.2. Low Nominal, Real and Equilibrium and Natural Real interest rates 
The shift to negative policy interest rates by some central banks has caused a stir among both 
the populace as well as economists. Usually dismissed as a theoretical curiosity, the argument 
against negative nominal interest rates have typically always been that, when faced with 
negative returns, any would be investor could simply alternatively hold currency instead.  
Yet it isn’t costless to hold currency: It may be subject to theft and physical destruction, is 
expensive to store and safeguard in large quantities and becomes difficult to use for large and 
remote transactions. (Anderson & Liu 2013) When taking these factors into account, most 
economists will begrudgingly accept moderately negative nominal interest rates as a realistic 
possibility. Ultimately, this should mean little more than that instead of a Zero Lower Bound 
there is perhaps a more aptly named “Slightly Negative Lower Bound”, but this should confer 
little practical significance. Most economists seem content to consider zero as the practical 
lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
A more common phenomenon than negative nominal interest rates is the case of negative real 
interest rates. Negative real interest rates occur when low enough nominal interest rates are 
faced with positive rates of inflation as per the Fischer equation: 
𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋 
Where r is the real interest rate which equals the nominal interest rate i, minus the inflation rate 
π.When faced with positive inflation the real interest rate will always be lower than its nominal 
counterpart. A low, but still positive, nominal interest rate can thus still result in a negative real 
interest rate when inflation is positive and high enough. Conversely, real interest rates will be 
higher than nominal ones in the presence of deflation. 
If an economy is hit by a bout of increased inflation this will then lead to lower real rates even 
if it were to be the case that nominal interest rates remain unchanged. Lowered real rates of 
interest will ultimately be the result of either lower nominal rates, a higher rate of inflation or 
both. 
In the long run, most economists believe that the real interest rate follows a long-run equilibrium. 
This equilibrium real interest rate, also known as the Wicksellian interest rate is based on 
macroeconomic factors not directly controllable by a central bank and it is also not directly 
observable. It is a target point around which a central back should not stray too far away from 
when they set their policy interest rate. 
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It may help to envision the relation with the simple loanable funds setup. Figure 1 below shows 
the supply and demand for loanable funds, which is the same as desired savings and investment 
and the corresponding real rate. We see then that this is simply the supply and demand of 
investment. Where the curves meet determines the equilibrium price of investment - the 
equilibrium real interest rate. As the market clearing rate, matching the two produces the real 
rate of interest at which the amount that firms wish to invest equals the amount that households 
wish to save.  
Figure 1: Supply and demand for loanable funds determines the equilibrium real rate 
 
We can also see that shifts in either demand or supply will lead to changes in the equilibrium 
real interest rate. In particular, an outward shift in savings (S to 𝑆1) or a downward shift in 
desired investment (I to 𝐼1) will push the equilibrium real interest rate down (𝑟
∗ down to 𝑟1
∗ or 
even 𝑟2
∗ the case of both). If it is the case the equilibrium real rate has decreased, then it should 
be the case then that either (or both) of the above two factors have shifted and are to the lower 
levels of the interest. 
Shifts in savings can caused by a multitude of factors, not limited to: changes in current income 
and expected future income, changes in uncertainty leading to precautionary saving, changes in 
demography, changes in public savings and financial innovation. Shifts in investments can be 
caused by a plethora of causes as well, including changes in investment profitability, changes 
in relative prices of investment goods or changes in financial intermediation. Furthermore one 
can consider demand of risky and safe assets. If demand for safer assets increases for whatever 
reason, all else equal, the rate will decrease for safe assets and increase for risky assets. 
(Blanchard, Furceri and Pescatori 2014) 
Now we further believe that saving is a function of output as well as the real interest rate. As 
output increases, so does people’s income and thus the amount that people wishes to save. As 
savings increases, this pushes the real interest rate down. This means that for every level of 
GDP we have a corresponding equilibrium real rate and these together make up the Investment 
Savings (IS)-curve. If the determinants of the IS curve (investment and savings) changes this 
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will cause the IS curve to shift either to the left or right. In particular the IS curve will shift to 
the left in the case of decreased investment or increased savings. 
Figure 2 below shows this relationship between the real interest rate and GDP output. Where 
the IS curve and the potential GDP line intersects, real GDP equals potential GDP, and the 
corresponding real interest rate equilibrium is the natural real interest rate. The natural real rate 
is the long-run equilibrium rate of real interest that corresponds to full employment. It is also 
the real rate of return required to keep the economy’s output equal to potential output. 
Figure 2: IS and potential GDP determines the natural real rate 
 
As the equilibrium real interest rate is not directly observable, measuring it goes by way of 
estimation. One of the best known cases of this is perhaps Laubach and Williams (2003) who 
show that it is highly time-variant. Further the equilibrium real rate has declined since 1960’s. 
Adding to this Justiniano and Primiceri (2010) also find a substantial degree of time variation 
in the equilibrium rate, and add that it has become negative on a number of occasions in the 
post-war period. Notably, they find that it has fallen sharply below towards the end of 2008. 
Aside from the above factors the real rate of interest can also deviate from its equilibrium rate 
due to monetary policy. As the market clearing rate for investment and savings, the central bank 
should normally wish to hold the interest rates at this level to maintain output at its potential 
level. It may however be the case that, a central bank wanting to, for example, achieve lower 
inflation, lets the real rate deviate from this natural rate for what is usually a limited amount of 
time. (Blanchard, Furceri and Pescatori 2014) 
Monetary policy traditionally enters the above relationship through the LM curve. If the IS-
curve has shifted due changes in the desired investment or savings, monetary policy can be used 
to adjust the supply of money so that the interest rate achieved is the natural rate and full 
employment is restored. But what happens if the IS curve has been shifted far enough to the left 
that the required natural real rate to restore full employment becomes negative?  
Because of the Zero Lower Bound restriction on nominal interest rates we discussed earlier, 
nominal interest rates are essentially locked at zero (Note that only nominal rates are locked at 
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zero, the real rate achieved will be the nominal rate minus any inflation.) This means that after 
a certain point, increases to the money supply, shifting the LM curve to right, will not produce 
any effect. 
Figure 3: IS-LM model with Zero Lower Bound imposed on nominal interest rates 
 
This is essentially Paul Krugman’s liquidity trap setting. To Krugman (1998), an economy 
trapped in a liquidity trap may require negative interest rates to re-attain full employment, but 
is unable to achieve this. This may occur if the current price level is high enough compared to 
the long-term price level so that people expect deflation, leading to a zero nominal interest rate 
resulting in a high real interest rate. It may also occur if people expect a low future income, 
causing precautionary saving even at unfavorable interest rates. The main effect of the liquidity 
trap is that conventional monetary policy, manipulating the policy interest rate, becomes 
impotent as nominal interest is already locked at zero. (Krugman 1998 p. 150) 
The secular stagnation and savings glut theories both work with the notion that the IS curve has 
shifted sharply to the left, necessitating negative real interest rates to restore full employment, 
though the theme is perhaps a bit more central to the stagnation view. What separates the two 
is the primary cause of this shift, in the secular stagnation view it is primarily factors leading to 
decreased investment, while the savings glut theory primarily points to excess global savings. 
The theories are looked at in more detail in the next two sections below. 
An alternative view to these hypotheses is that the interest rates are simply kept low because 
we are in the aftermath of the most significant financial crisis and economic recession in recent 
memory. This builds on the observation that many crises leave permanent scars for the 
economies that are affected, a persistent loss of output that is rarely recovered, or at least 
remains highly persistent. (Cerra and Saxena 2008) 
Because crises are typically associated with lower medium term growth (Reinhart and Reinhart 
2015), there is cause to keep interest rates lower following a major crises to foster economic 
activity. The low interest rate would then be kept low because it is still too early to raise them 
and we are essentially still in an elongated recovery process. 
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2.3. Secular stagnation hypothesis 
The term “secular stagnation” was coined by Alvin Hansen in his 1938 American Economic 
Association presidential address, “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth.” 
Writing in the latter stages of the Great Depression, Hansen argued that, because of apparent 
slowdowns in population growth and the pace of technological advance, firms were unlikely to 
see much reason to invest in new capital goods. He concluded that meager investment spending, 
together with subdued consumption by households, would likely prevent the attainment of full 
employment for many years. Hansen did not anticipate the postwar economic boom and burst 
in population growth, so the secular stagnation theory fell into the background.  
The theory has recently been brought forward again by Lawrence Summers who argues that 
Hansen’s concerns may be far more applicable in the economies of today. The weak economic 
performance following the Great Recession, which both US and Europe have suffered from, 
could possibly be indicative of what is to be the norm in the foreseeable future rather than 
exceptional circumstance, according to Summers. The suggestion struck a chord with many 
economists, and secular stagnation is again the subject of debate (see for example Eichengreen 
2014 & 2015, Gordon 2014, Krugman 2014, Summers 2013, 2014a, 2014b & 2015 among 
others). 
Eichengreen (2015) calls secular stagnation a downward tendency of the real interest rate, 
which reflects an excess of desired saving over desired investment. The result is a persistent 
output gap and/or sluggish economic growth. One the biggest concerns of the secular stagnation 
hypothesis is that there may be “no attainable interest rate [that] will permit the balancing of 
saving and investment at full employment.” (Summers 2014b)  
Normally, when an economy is hit with a shock that would cause increased precautionary 
saving and reduce the propensity to invest it would normally cause interest rates to fall until 
saving and investment are in equilibrium around the full employment level of output. But for 
such a change to occur in all possible circumstances it necessitates full interest rate flexibility. 
Because short term interest rates cannot fall appreciably below zero due to the possibility of 
currency substitution, short term interest rates are not fully flexible in modern economies. 
(Summers 2014b) The ZLB is thus a natural market imperfection that may make it impossible 
for investment to match saving for full employment (Summers 2015) 
As such, the case of Summers’ secular stagnation is that not only has weak demand pushed 
interest rates towards zero, to reach equilibrium they may need to be lowered even further, but 
cannot, as the nominal interest rates are locked at the ZLB. The issue may be further worsened 
by wage and price flexibility, as more flexible wages and prices are expected to fall during 
output slowdowns. Such falls will then lead to an increase in real interest rates. (Summers 
2014b) 
This is essentially the liquidity trap setting caused by weak demand; the required real rates are 
negative but they stop decreasing once the nominal interest rates reach the ZLB. The result is 
weak economic growth, high unemployment and the death of the efficacy of conventional 
monetary policy. The main difference, is that while the liquidity trap has frequently been treated 
as the result of a temporary shock the threat of secular stagnation may persist indefinitely. 
(Krugman 2014) 
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Another key feature of Summers’ hypothesis is that it may be still possible to attain full 
employment, but this comes at the cost of financial stability. This may take the form of financial 
bubbles and the like, he argues, suggesting that the US may well have entered a state of secular 
stagnation before the economic meltdown in 2008. The crisis was after all, he argues, caused 
by the bursting of the worst housing bubble in over a century, yet the bubble period preceding 
the crisis was characterized by rather tame economic performance in comparison. (Summers 
2014b) 
Summers argues that the economies of today exhibit symptoms that are consistent with what 
one would expect if the equilibrium real interest rate has declined. He identifies a number of 
reasons for this, including: reductions in demand for debt-financed investment, decline in 
population growth, growing inequality in income distribution, substantially lower prices of 
capital goods and considerable accumulation of safe assets in central bank reserves around the 
globe. (Summers 2014b) 
Eichengreen (2015) points to rising savings rates due to the emergence of emerging markets; 
declining investment rates due to shortages of attractive investment opportunities, declining 
relative prices of investment goods, as well as declining population growth rates.  Gordon 
(2015) points to four ‘headwinds’ as causing the demise of growth: (1) declining labor 
participation rate exacerbated by declining productivity growth, (2) absence of an educational 
revolution since 1970’s, (3) income inequality disfavoring the 99% and thereby weakening 
demand and (4) the mounting of public debt. (Gordon 2015) 
Summers preferred method of dealing with secular stagnation is to raise demand and 
consequently pull desired investment up to match savings, thereby raising the natural 
equilibrium rate of interest to an attainable level. Concretely he proposes raising public 
investment to deal with what is essentially a market failure, stating that “public investment, that 
would have been irrational at a high real interest rate, becomes rational at a lower rate” 
(Summers 2014b)  
Other possibilities include reducing structural barriers to private investment, promoting 
business confidence, maintaining spending power through social protections and reduce 
inequality to redistribute income to those with a higher propensity to spend. Lastly, though 
Summers does not put much stock into the idea, is to simply lower the real interest rate further 
by inducing more inflation, which could done raising the inflation target or employing 
quantitative easing to reduce credit or term premiums. This may come at the price of increased 
financial instability (Summers 2014a)  
2.4. The savings glut hypothesis 
The savings glut hypothesis was first voiced by former head chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, in a speech back in 2005. Originally raised to address the often heard 
international criticism of the very high US current account deficits, he argued that these were a 
result of an international excess in saving and not just primarily US domestic policy alone:  
“To be more specific, I will argue that over the past decade a combination of 
diverse forces has created a significant increase in the global supply of 
saving--a global saving glut--which helps to explain both the increase in the 
U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term real 
interest rates in the world today” (Bernanke 2005) 
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Chief among these forces, Bernanke argued was a remarkable reversal in the flow of credit to 
developing and emerging-market economies, turning these economies from borrowers to 
lenders on international capital markets. (Bernanke 2005) 
It is this resulting global excess of desired saving over desired investment, originating in large 
part from China and other Asian emerging market economies as well as oil producers like Saudi 
Arabia, that was a key factor for the low global interest rates. The inflow of foreign capital also 
helped to push up the value of the dollar and so contributed to the large and persistent US trade 
deficit. (Bernanke 2015b) 
Eichengreen (2015) notes that emerging markets are “financially underdeveloped, forcing 
households to substitute brute force accumulation for portfolio diversification.” Lacking social 
safety nets in the public sector encourages precautionary saving for contingencies and old age 
among the population while central banks and governments rely on reserve accumulation as 
insurance against financial shocks. As the share of GDP of the emerging markets has risen, so 
too have global savings rates. (Eichengreen 2015) 
The flows of capital involved have been considerable. The US expanded rapidly during the 
latter 1990’s and beginning of the 2000’s. Between 1996 and 2004 the US deficit grew from 
$125 billion to over $640 billion. This, however was not matched by increases in US investment 
rates, which remained at rough a constant around 19% of GDP. The increase was instead 
matched by increases in net capital flows from abroad. (Bernanke 2007) Since then Great 
Recession has come and gone but the situation has largely persisted. 
In a blogpost from early 2015 Bernanke updated his assessment made from his 2005 and 2007 
speeches and he asserted that while the savings glut had changed its characteristics following 
the Great Recession, it was still prevalent. The US Current account deficit peaked in 2006 at 
just over $800 billion. Following the crisis, the deficit had effectively halved to $440 billion by 
2010 but still remained above $400 billion as of 2013. The deficit was still matched by current 
account surpluses in Asia and to some degree in Europe, most notably Germany. (Bernanke 
2015b) 
Arora, Tyers and Zhang (2014) find empirical evidence that there is negative long-term 
relationship between 10-year US bond yields and current account surpluses in China and Japan. 
Because of the market for long bonds being comparatively integrated long-term bond rates are 
indicative of the world natural rate, thus suggesting Asia has a leading role in the expansion of 
global saving contributing to declining trend in real long yields since 1980. (Arora, Tyers and 
Zhang 2014) 
The international capital inflows may not just have lowered Treasure yields but also returns on 
other apparently safe US assets as well, including mortgages, in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis. The capital inflows largely consisted of purchases of treasuries and agencies by 
emerging market economies seeking safe assets to invest their current account surpluses with, 
but also included purchases of highly rated private mortgage backed securities by other 
investors who sought a broader range of assets but greatly valued perceived safety. The low 
long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, then added to the protracted rise in housing 
prices. As such it may be that international capital flows played a not insignificant role in 
helping to finance the housing bubble. (Bernanke et al. 2011) 
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2.5. Both theories 
Both the savings glut hypothesis and the secular stagnation hypothesis seek to explain the low 
equilibrium real interest rate as the result of a lack of demand over saving:  
“There is some similarity between the global saving glut and secular 
stagnation ideas: Both posit an excess of desired saving over desired capital 
investment at ‘normal’ interest rates, implying substantial downward 
pressure on market rates. Both can account for slower US growth: Secular 
stagnation works through reduced domestic investment and consumption, the 
global savings glut through weaker exports and a larger trade deficit.” 
(Bernanke 2015b) 
There are however significant differences as well. Secular stagnation explains muted capital 
investment through weakened fundamentals such slow population growth, low capital intensity 
in new industries and declining relative prices of capital. The saving glut hypothesis in contrast 
primarily traces the finger back to government policy decisions as the cause of the excess of 
desired saving over desired investment. Another point of difference is that the former primarily 
focuses on factors in single countries or regions, while the latter attributes the results stemming 
from global interaction.  (Bernanke 2015b) 
These differences matter, not least because they prescribe very different policy responses. If 
secular stagnation is the cause for the low growth and low rates, then expansionary fiscal policy 
could be useful, and in the longer run, structural reform to improve the returns of capital 
investment, but ultimately efforts should be directed at promoting public and private investment 
(Summers 2015)  
If the state of secular stagnation and low interest rates perpetuates, as Blanchard, Furceri and 
Pescatori (2014) warn they might, it will have important implications for stabilization policy. 
The effectiveness of even unconventional monetary policy is reduced at the zero lower bound, 
while fiscal policy gets a small boost, as sustaining or decreasing debt become easier at low 
rates. Less enthusiastic about the use of fiscal expansion for extended periods of time, Krugman 
(2014) warns that if we are unable to leave the state of secular stagnation and low interest rates 
will be the norm for the foreseeable future, considerable rethinking of macroeconomic policy 
may be in order. 
On the other hand if the global savings glut is the cause of the low interest rates, another set of 
policy responses would be in order. Specifically, as a result of current (worldwide) policies, the 
right response would be to try and reverse these so that they no longer generate the savings glut. 
Freeing up international capital flows and reduce interventions in foreign exchange markets 
(Bernanke 2015b) 
3. Data 
Two data sets are examined, a “long” set and a “wide” set. The “long” data sample consists of 
yearly observations for 12 countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA) across 116 years (1881 to 1996). 
The country selection mainly reflects the availability of data. See Bordo and Jonung (2001) for 
full list of data sources. 
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The “wide” data sample consists of yearly observations for 24 OECD countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States). The shortfall in countries 
compared to the full OECD roster again reflects the availability of data. The data extends for 
55 years between from 1960 to 2014. 
The real interest rate examined is ex post and was calculated as long-term interest rate data 
minus yearly CPI inflation. Other variables of interest are inflation, per capita GDP, gross 
capital formation and savings identified as gross capital formation + current account balance. 
4. Findings 
In this section I will present the main findings from studying the development of the real rate 
in the two data sets. This sections is divided into two parts, a descriptive one where the historical 
attributes of past periods of low interest rates are mapped out to create an overview of how low 
interest rate periods in the past have looked and a cause analysis where we try to determine 
whether low interest rate periods have been caused by low investment or high savings. 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
We begin by creating an historic overview the evolution of the interest rate incorporating both 
our long and wide data samples. Three variables are investigated: the real interest rate, the rate 
of inflation and the rate of real GDP per capita growth. 
The focal point of the analysis is the real interest rate and how past low interest rates periods 
compared to the current one, and so three aspects are examined: how frequent low interest rates 
have been, how widely spread between countries periods of low interest were and the length of 
low interest periods. 
Frequency of low interest rates 
First we examine the frequency at which low interest rates has occurred in the past by examining 
the 12 countries with data from the late 19th century.  
By defining “low interest rate periods” as periods when the real interest level in a given country 
was below the chosen threshold levels of 0%, 1% and 2%, respectively, we find that such 
periods have occurred fairly frequently and to varying degrees in each country. Table 1 below 
shows how many years the real interest rate went below the threshold, how big a ratio this was 
out of the whole sample period, and the average period length in years each low interest rate 
period was, for each country and each threshold level. 
The country in which the real interest rate went below the threshold levels the least frequently 
was Germany, which in the case of a negative real rate experienced this during 14 years out of 
the 126 years with available data, or 11% of the time. It is likely that real interest rate was 
negative, or at least very low, during a portion of the missing years as these are during the two 
world wars, but even if this were to be the case for all of them, Germany would still have the 
fewest years with low interest rates. 
The countries that experienced the most frequent dips below the threshold levels were France 
and Norway, which both experienced negative real interest rates during 37 years out of the 
whole 134-year period, or about 27.5% of the time. On the whole, “low interest rate” levels 
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occur relatively frequently, on average 20.5%, 29% and 40.5% of the time, respectively, in 
these countries throughout the sample period. 
Table 1: Number of Low Interest Rate Periods 1881-2014 for 12 countries 
  Real rate <0 Real rate <1 Real rate <2 
  years ratio length years ratio length years ratio length 
USA 22 0,1642 2,20 36 0,2687 2,40 52 0,3881 3,06 
UK 29 0,2164 2,64 39 0,2910 2,44 59 0,4403 3,28 
Germany 14 0,1111 2,00 23 0,1825 2,56 34 0,2698 2,27 
France 37 0,2761 3,70 43 0,3209 4,78 63 0,4701 3,50 
Canada 24 0,1791 2,40 36 0,2687 2,25 53 0,3955 3,31 
Italy 30 0,2239 3,00 33 0,2463 2,75 46 0,3433 3,29 
Belgium 22 0,1803 1,47 33 0,2705 2,06 42 0,3443 2,33 
Netherlands 35 0,2612 2,33 44 0,3284 2,75 57 0,4254 2,85 
Switzerland 27 0,2015 2,08 41 0,3060 2,28 63 0,4701 3,32 
Denmark 22 0,1642 1,57 39 0,2910 2,05 55 0,4104 2,62 
Norway 37 0,2761 2,06 50 0,3731 2,17 64 0,4776 3,56 
Sweden 26 0,1940 2,00 41 0,3060 2,41 59 0,4403 2,81 
Average 27,08 0,2040 2,29 38,17 0,2878 2,57 53,92 0,4063 3,02 
  
Table 2: Number of Low Interest Rate Periods 1960-2014 for 24 countries 
  Real rate <0 Real rate <1 Real rate <2 
  years ratio length years ratio length years ratio length 
Australia 6 0,11 6,00 8 0,15 4,00 19 0,35 3,17 
Austria 2 0,04 1,00 2 0,04 3,00 13 0,26 2,60 
Belgium 4 0,07 2,00 8 0,15 2,00 13 0,24 3,25 
Canada 3 0,05 3,00 8 0,15 2,00 14 0,25 3,50 
Denmark 5 0,09 1,25 12 0,22 2,40 16 0,29 2,67 
Finland 11 0,21 5,00 15 0,28 6,00 20 0,38 6,00 
France 5 0,09 2,50 10 0,18 3,33 20 0,36 3,33 
Germany 1 0,02 1,00 4 0,07 1,00 8 0,15 3,00 
Greece 2 N/A 2,00 7 N/A 1,75 11 N/A 5,50 
Iceland 10 N/A 5,00 13 N/A 6,50 15 N/A 7,50 
Ireland 12 0,22 2,00 19 0,35 3,80 23 0,42 5,75 
Italy 8 0,15 2,67 8 0,15 2,67 23 0,42 3,20 
Japan 8 0,16 2,00 14 0,29 2,33 16 0,33 4,33 
South Korea 2 0,05 2,00 5 0,12 1,25 12 0,29 2,40 
Luxembourg 6 0,13 2,00 14 0,31 3,50 19 0,42 3,80 
Netherlands 9 0,16 2,25 16 0,29 3,20 23 0,42 2,88 
New Zealand 15 0,27 5,00 17 0,31 4,25 20 0,36 5,00 
Norway 12 0,22 2,00 19 0,35 2,38 26 0,48 4,33 
Portugal 16 0,30 5,33 22 0,42 4,40 30 0,57 6,00 
Spain 1 0,03 1,00 5 0,14 1,67 12 0,33 6,00 
Sweden 7 0,13 1,75 14 0,25 2,00 23 0,42 2,56 
Switzerland 12 0,22 2,00 22 0,40 2,44 36 0,65 4,00 
UK 10 0,18 4,00 12 0,22 5,00 18 0,33 5,00 
USA 7 0,13 1,75 13 0,24 2,60 24 0,44 4,80 
Average 7,25 0,13 2,69 11,96 0,21 3,06 18,92 0,34 4,19 
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If we widen the sample to include the wider selection of countries we find that the results are 
similar. Table 2 below shows the corresponding data to Table 1 for the select 24 OECD 
countries over the period 1960 to 2014. Overall, the fraction of the total time period that was 
made up of “low interest rate periods” is noticeably smaller in the latter sample: on average 
13%, 21% and 34% of the time, respectively, were spent below the threshold levels. This would 
be consistent with the view that the interest rate in the post war period has been higher. 
There is also a greater level of diffusion in the amount of years that the countries experienced 
low interest rates between countries: countries like Germany, Austria and Spain for instance 
experienced negative real interest rates less than 5 % of the whole time period while New 
Zealand and Portugal had negative interest rates more than 25% of the period. 
Global Spread of low interest rates 
Next we look at how widespread the cases of low interest rates were by examining how many 
countries experienced low interest rates at the same time. If most countries simultaneously 
experience it is likely that is due to some event that affects the economy on a global scale. 
A sizable portion of countries experienced low interest rate periods at the same time. Table 2 
below summarizes when at least 9 of the 12 countries in the long-run data sample were 
simultaneously below each threshold level. Some of these coincide with some major events, 
economic as well as non-economic. Notably, low interest rates occurred across most of the 
countries coinciding with the 1907 Bankers’ Panic, the two world wars, the first oil shock and 
the ensuing Great Stagflation period during the 1970’s and most recently the Great Recession 
in 2008 and the following current predicament. 
For some countries, like Germany and the US, years of low real interest rate that coincide with 
these events will account for over half of the years the interest rate were below the thresholds 
in these countries meaning that most cases of low interest rates in these countries were likely 
caused by these major events. For others countries like France and Norway, they account for 
less than a third of the total amount of years of low interest.  
The interest rates seem to move largely together even when not in conjunction to these major 
events. For instance all of the above countries experienced frequent sporadic bursts of low 
interest rates during late 19th century and start of 20th century leading up to the first world war, 
but what years and for how long vary from country to country. 
During the First World War, the real interest rate became strongly negative for 5-6 years for all 
countries reflecting the sharp increase in inflation that it brought about. During the inter-war 
period interest rates remained high for the most part between most countries, France and 
Belgium being the more notable exceptions. The Second World War again saw interest rate 
drop as inflation spiraled and most countries experienced low interest rates during and around 
the 1940’s. After World War 2 until the 1970’s, some countries, like Germany, Canada and 
Belgium experienced very few instances of low interest rates, while others, like the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and three Nordic countries of Denmark Norway and Sweden experienced more. 
During the 1970’s most countries experience low interest rates for some years (Germany being 
the one notable exception), but its length and severity vary greatly from country to country. 
This observation also holds true when considering the wider sample of 24 countries. From 1981 
to about 2000 there are very few instances of real interest rates lower than 2% in any country.  
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Table 3: Globally occurring low interest rate events 
Period r<0 r<1 r<2 Event 
1889      
1907    1907 Banker's panic 
1910      
1915-1920    World War 1 
1937      
1940-1942    World War 2 
1947-1948      
1951      
1956      
1973    OPEC 1  
1974-1975    Great Stagflation 
1977      
2005      
2008    Great Recession 
2010-2014      
 
Interesting to note, however, is that many countries, specifically Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, 
US, South Korea, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the US, as well as to a lesser 
extent Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway, start having low real 
interest rates well before the meltdown in 2008, suggesting that the crisis and recession, at the 
very least was not the sole cause. Following 2008 only the PIIGS countries of Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain do not have single year of low real interest rates. 
Low interest rate period length 
Examining the cases of the low interest rates periods individually in each country we find that 
there is a general pattern of interest rate periods appearing sporadically in most countries in 
shorter bursts of between 1 to 3 years, as well as longer periods that sometimes spans upwards 
a decade or more. These longer periods typically coincide with the widely spread events 
identified above. 
In the US for instance, most periods of interest rates below the thresholds do come in shorter 
spurts between one and three years long except for the following notable exceptions: a five year 
period (1916-1920) connecting to World War 1, a twelve year period (1941-1952, 1950 is an 
exception) during and after World War 2, eight years during the 1970’s (1973-1980 with 1976 
being an exception) and finally from 2008 and onwards (2009 being an exception). In the UK, 
we have a similar situation, with longer periods of low real interest rates occurring between 
1915-1920, 1939-1952, 1974-1980 and 2008 onwards. 
Germany is one of the countries with the fewest instances of real rates below the thresholds, 
and this is partly due to missing or unreliable data from around the world wars. After the wars 
Germany had had one of the longest periods of uninterrupted high interest rates of any of the 
countries. Since 1956, the real interest rate remained above the 2% threshold for nearly 50 years 
until 2005, meaning it was one of the few countries spared the inflation hike of the 1970’s. 
Since 2005 only 2 years (2006 and 2009) has had interest rates above 2% threshold. 
France is the country that has had the most instances of low interest rates among the countries 
with much available data, and is also one of the countries with the longest periods of low interest 
rates. Long interest rate periods are found between 1915-1920, 1923-1927, 1936-1952 (one of 
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the longest periods of negative real rates for any of the countries), 1973-1980 and 2008 and 
onwards. 
A general observation can be made that the current period of low real interest rates is not 
exceptional in the sense that it is not longest period of low real interest rates that has been 
experienced. While the lengths of the periods of low interest rates will vary heavily from 
country to country, most of the countries have experienced longer periods of low interest rate 
than the current one. 
To closer examine the characteristics of low interest rate periods, we will employ the following 
method of choosing low interest rate periods in each set to study: first we smooth the interest 
rate data by calculating a 3 year moving average for each country. Any period of at least 5 years 
in length in which the real rate MA was below the 2% threshold is then selected as a noteworthy 
period and examined below. We then employ simple mean comparison of select variables of 
these low rate periods, with the rest of the data sample. 
Inflation 
As this paper concerns itself with the real interest rates, the rate of inflation becomes a variable 
of key interest. A low real interest rate will be the result of either low nominal interest rates or 
a high rate of inflation or both. The difference between the real rate and inflation is of course 
the nominal rate. Do past periods of low real interest coincide with mounting inflation rates or 
not and how does this compare to the current predicament? 
We know from history that many of the larger events should have caused increased inflation, 
such as the world wars where scarcity due to halted or decreased trade caused prices for many 
goods to rise significantly. Likewise, the “Great stagflation” during the 1970’s was a period 
triggered by the first oil shock, where a lengthy negative supply shock combined with 
expansionary monetary policy triggered high inflation. 
Table 4 below compares the mean rate of inflation before 1961 with those experienced during 
periods of low interest rate of noteworthy length in each of the 12 countries in the long data set. 
What we see then is that not only do the low interest rate periods that include the world wars 
coincide with increased inflation, but so are all other periods as well. The rate of inflation still 
sees it greatest increase during the wars. 
The mindful reader may here notice that the mean rate of inflation appears negative for most 
countries when we do not include the periods during which the real rates were low. This, 
however, should not indicate that most countries experienced deflation for the majority of the 
time between 1881 and 1960, but it can rather be explained by the intensity of the inflation rates 
experienced during the world wars. As the comparison period will include the years in which 
the greatly inflated war prices normalized, the mean for the whole period will appear negative. 
The general observation that past episodes of low real rates have all coincided with increased 
rates of inflation can be extended to the countries of the wide data set as well and generally 
applies until the 2000’s. Tables 5a and 5b compares the mean rate of inflation experienced after 
1960 in the same way as table 4, for the countries in the wide data set. The 1970’s too, as one 
might suspect, shows near universal increases in the rate of inflation across most countries. 
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Table 4: Inflation rates 1881-1960 
Country Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1881-1960 -2,03 1881-1960 -1,12 1881-1960 -1,65 1881-1960 -0,95 1881-1960 0,93 1881-1960 -0,46 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1923-1929 
13,10 
1905-1913 
2,55 
1911-1920 
11,74 
1914-1921 
16,62 
1914-1922 
169,36 
1914-1922 
20,46 
(-4,45)*** (-4,49)*** (-5,15)*** (-3,05)** (-1,37) (-3,55)*** 
  
  
1915-1920 
11,22 
1938-1943 
7,78 
1923-1929 
12,20 
  
  
1936-1948 
51,70 
  (-4,88)*** (-2,36)* (-3,30)**   (-2,03)* 
  
  
1936-1943 
2,73 
1938-1952 
5,13 
1936-1953 
22,94 
  
  
  
  
  (-3,61)*** (-4,01)*** (-5,70)***     
  
  
1945-1952 
5,85 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  (-3,70)***        
             
Country Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1881-1960 -2,31 1881-1960 -2,40 1881-1960 -1,73 1881-1960 -1,68 1881-1960 -2,10 1881-1960 -1,60 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1914-1919 
12,29 
1911-1920 
13,93 
1912-1919 
14,65 
1914-1919 
14,57 
1897-1901 
1,72 
1915-1920 
12,35 
(-4,99)*** (-3,47)*** (-3,51)*** (-4,12)*** (-2,26)** (-4,94)*** 
1937-1958 
6,31 
1936-1947 
4,95 
1935-1943 
5,04 
1937-1943 
6,10 
1910-1920 
9,55 
1940-1953 
5,29 
(-5,58)*** (-3,62)*** (-3,88)*** (-3,90)*** (-4,48)*** (-4,43)*** 
  
  
1949-1955 
6,56 
1947-1959 
4,05 
  
  
1935-1953 
4,50 
  
 
  (-3,99)*** (-4,37)***   (-6,74)***  
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: See Bordo and Jonung (2001) 
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Table 5a: Inflation rates 1961-2014 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 4,06 1961-2014 3,19 1961-2014 3,21 1961-2014 3,31 1961-2014 4,84 1961-2014 3,35 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1972-1980 
10,94 
1973-1977 
7,66 
1973-1978 
8,86 
1974-1980 
9,35 
1963-1968 
6,31 
1972-1982 
11,64 
(-5,85)*** (-6,25)*** (-4,02)*** (-9,65)*** (-1,56) (-7,15)*** 
  
  
2010-2014 
2,23 
2010-2014 
2,00 
  
  
2008-2014 
1,93 
2008-2014 
2,00 
  (2,46)** (1,82)   (4,35)*** (1,95)* 
             
Country France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 3,11 1961-2014 1,45 1961-2014 3,98 1961-2014 2,32 1961-2014 2,86 1961-2014 4,06 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1973-1982 
11,06 
2010-2014 
1,52 
2003-2008 
3,37 
2000-2014 
5,52 
1971-1983 
14,27 
1973-1982 
16,32 
(-10,55)*** (-0,24) (0,67) (-3,65)*** (-8,41)*** (-11,17)*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2000-2008 
4,01 
 
 
        (-1,91)*  
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD 
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Table 5b: Inflation rates 1961-2014 
Country Japan South Korea Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 2,36 1961-2014 7,04 1961-2014 2,89 1961-2014 2,60 1961-2014 3,94 1961-2014 3,33 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1969-1986 
9,24 
2010-2014 
2,35 
1972-1977 
8,01 
1963-1967 
4,84 
1966-1983 
10,49 
1963-1983 
7,37 
(-3,78)*** (3,66)*** (-5,10)*** (-3,42)** (-5,02)*** (-4,95)*** 
2002-2014 
0,07 
  
  
2003-2007 
2,35 
1971-1978 
7,84 
  
  
2009-2014 
1,79 
(4,14)***   (1,36) (-6,99)***   (3,20)*** 
  
  
  
  
2009-2014 
1,85 
2010-2014 
1,91 
 
  
 
 
    (1,70) (1,57)    
             
Country Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 5,14 1961-2014 4,62 1961-2014 3,32 1961-2014 1,24 1961-2014 2,69 1961-2014 2,90 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1962-1986 
14,07 
2002-2008 
3,27 
1962-1967 
4,46 
1962-1969 
3,49 
2008-2014 
2,91 
1973-1981 
9,04 
(-4,33)*** (2,05)** (-1,50) (-6,02)*** (-0,39) (-6,65)*** 
2001-2008 
3,00 
  
  
1971-1982 
9,42 
1971-1977 
5,92 
  
  
2005-2014 
2,29 
(2,18)**   (-6,98)*** (-3,74)***   (1,34) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1979-1985 
4,16 
  
  
  
  
      (-5,12)***     
  
  
  
  
  
  
2004-2013 
0,57 
  
  
 
 
      (1,83)*    
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD 
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After 2000 however we seem to have a near opposite scenario, with inflation rates noticeably 
lower or largely unchanged compared to the longer average mean. Notable exceptions are 
Iceland and Ireland that experienced increased inflation beginning from 2000 compared to 
before. This sets the current experience apart from previous episodes in that the low interest 
rates are a result of low nominal interest rates alone, whereas high inflation had a hand in most 
of the past spells of low real rates. 
GDP outcome 
The period of following the Great Recession has not only seen low interest rates but sluggish 
economic performance as well. Do any previous periods share this dynamic? Table 6 compares 
means of per capita growth rates before 1971 with those during low rate periods. 
There appears to be little in the way of systematic outcome when comparing per capita GDP 
growth rates during low real interest rate periods before 1970. What’s more the effect of low 
real interest rates appear to have little effect on GDP growth rates. The periods that see the 
biggest switches in GDP growth rates are unsurprisingly those periods which again include the 
world wars, and the switches go both ways. 
As such any change during these periods should naturally be caused by their respective wars, 
increased productivity due to the mobilization of production resources during war time booms 
in cases where GDP rose, and war destruction of assets and reduced trade opportunities in those 
cases where GDP fell, rather than indicating any pattern of low real rates coinciding with lower 
or higher growth rates. 
Among the periods remaining, few seemed to coincided with noteworthy changes in GDP 
growth rates, four cases present an exception, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway, all in the 
late 50’s and 60’s all show increased GDP growth rates, which should be indicative of the post-
war boom more than anything else. 
Tables 7a and 7b show the corresponding comparisons after 1971 for the countries in the wide 
data set. The 1970’s saw very little change in the average GDP growth rates with most countries 
not experiencing any statistical difference between their means. The exceptions are Italy and 
Norway who experienced higher growth rates. 
During the 2000’s most countries see a noted decrease in GDP growth rates. Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland stand apart in that they have no statistically significant 
difference in their means. Among these we have Germany which was managed to weather the 
recent crisis very well, three countries whose low interest rate periods do not include the crisis 
years itself (Greece, Ireland and Spain). Furthermore we have Luxembourg which stands further 
apart in that it experienced no real change in its growth rate during the period of 2003-2007, 
while they decrease significantly during the period of 2009-2014. 
This seems suggestive that overall, past and present periods of low real interest rates has seldom 
seen it affect GDP growth rates. The periods with the greatest changes included in them the two 
most destructive conflicts in human history, with all that that entails, as well the most severe 
economic crisis in recent memory.  
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Table 6: GDP per capita growth rates 1881-1970 
Country Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1881-1970 2,58 1881-1970 1,36 1881-1970 2,57 1881-1970 1,71 1881-1970 1,67 1881-1970 1,85 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1923-1929 
2,86 
1905-1913 
3,40 
1911-1920 
0,92 
1914-1921 
-0,73 
1914-1922 
-1,85 
1914-1922 
0,05 
(-0,22) (-1,06) (0,83) (0,50) (0,98) (1,47) 
  
  
1915-1920 
0,22 
1938-1943 
0,49 
1923-1929 
3,98 
  
  
1936-1948 
1,26 
  (0,35) (0,24) (-1,20)   (0,11) 
  
  
1936-1943 
8,08 
1938-1952 
2,21 
1936-1953 
2,88 
  
  
1962-1966 
3,97 
  (-2,95)** (0,26) (-0,31)   (-2,32)** 
  
  
1945-1952 
0,92 
1962-1967 
3,45 
1957-1964 
4,76 
  
  
  
  
  (0,29) (-0,70) (-3,55)***    
             
Country Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1881-1970 1,82 1881-1970 1,76 1881-1970 2,68 1881-1970 1,40 1881-1970 1,06 1881-1970 1,08 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1914-1919 
0,81 
1911-1920 
2,45 
1912-1919 
-0,04 
1937-1943 
-0,57 
1897-1901 
2,05 
1915-1920 
0,61 
(0,21) (-0,31) (-1,32) (1,76) (-0,42) (0,12) 
1937-1958 
2,87 
1936-1947 
2,36 
1935-1943 
2,11 
1961-1968 
2,84 
1910-1920 
0,09 
1940-1953 
3,86 
(-0,29) (-0,26) (-0,52) (-1,65) (0,62) (-1,20) 
1962-1968 
3,80 
1949-1955 
3,01 
1947-1959 
2,83 
  
  
1935-1953 
1,95 
  
  
(-2,11)** (-1,66) (-0,25)   (-0,97)   
  
  
1961-1970 
3,36 
1961-1966 
3,92 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  (-2,16)** (-1,47)      
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: See Bordo and Jonung (2001) 
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Table 7a: GDP per capita growth rates 1971-2014 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1971-2014 1,79 1971-2014 2,02 1971-2014 1,90 1971-2014 1,64 1971-2014 2,13 1971-2014 2,53 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1972-1980 
1,54 
1973-1977 
3,55 
1973-1978 
2,81 
1974-1980 
2,18 
2008-2014 
-0,91 
1972-1982 
3,22 
(0,50) (-1,53) (-0,73) (-0,88) (3,32)** (-0,71) 
  
  
2010-2014 
0,75 
2010-2014 
0,44 
  
  
  
  
2008-2014 
-1,16 
  (1,34)* (2,90)***     (2,44)** 
             
Country France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1971-2014 1,59 1971-2014 1,95 1971-2014 -0,09 1971-2014 3,71 1971-2014 4,04 1971-2014 1,14 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1973-1982 
2,46 
2010-2014 
1,89 
2003-2008 
3,25 
2000-2014 
1,63 
1971-1983 
2,70 
1973-1982 
3,01 
(-1,25) (0,06) (-2,12)* (1,71) (1,26) (-1,83)* 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2000-2008 
3,06 
 
 
        (0,69)  
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD 
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Table 7b: GDP per capita growth rates 1971-2014 
Country Japan South Korea Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1971-2014 2,91 1971-2014 6,36 1971-2014 3,85 1971-2014 1,93 1971-2014 1,31 1971-2014 2,36 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1971-1978 
3,25 
2010-2014 
3,22 
1972-1977 
1,85 
1971-1978 
2,39 
1971-1983 
1,31 
1971-1983 
3,58 
(-0,31) (3,00)*** (0,92) (-0,63) (0,00) (-2,25)** 
2002-2014 
0,81 
  
  
2003-2007 
2,98 
2010-2014 
0,10 
  
  
2009-2014 
-0,30 
(2,62)**   (0,68) (3,00)***   (3,78)*** 
  
  
  
  
2009-2014 
-0,19 
  
  
 
  
 
 
    (2,23)**      
             
Country Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1971-2014 2,34 1971-2014 1,89 1971-2014 1,81 1971-2014 1,13 1971-2014 2,52 1971-2014 2,25 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1971-1986 
2,69 
2002-2008 
1,39 
1971-1982 
1,49 
1971-1977 
0,66 
1971-1981 
1,75 
1973-1981 
1,85 
(-0,26) (0,83) (0,49) (0,37) (0,80) (0,42) 
2001-2008 
0,75 
  
  
  
  
1979-1985 
1,65 
2008-2014 
-0,12 
2005-2014 
0,64 
(1,84)*     (-0,62) (2,77)** (2,36)** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
2004-2013 
1,26 
  
  
 
 
      (-0,18)    
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD 
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Summary 
In this section we have mapped the general appearance of low real rates historically and made 
observations on low rate periods in terms of their frequency, length and global spread and how 
inflation and GDP growth developed during them. From these observations a general pattern 
seems to emerge: while negative or low real interest rates have not been infrequent in the past, 
they typically have appeared sporadically and lasted only for short spurts of between 1 and 3 
years. The general exception to this is when a major event, economic or otherwise has taken 
place, and ushered in lengthy periods of high inflation. 
This seemed to be the case with both world wars and the Great Inflation of the 1970’s, which 
involved most of the world’s countries, where most experienced lengthier periods of lower real 
rates along with increased rates of inflation, but also applies to most other lengthier episodes of 
low real rates as well. In many of these cases the higher inflation and lower real rates would 
often persist for several years after the event has ended. While increased inflation has gone hand 
in hand with past bouts of low interest rates, the same can generally not be said of GDP growth 
rates, which had typically only been note worthily affected during the world wars. 
The latest predicament breaks the mold as most countries have generally been experiencing 
lower rates of inflation since the beginning of the 2000’s or even before, not higher, making it 
unique in this regard. GDP grow rates has also been affected, with most countries experiencing 
lower growth following the crisis, though this partly because of the crisis itself. Also, as many 
countries began experiencing low interest rates well before the crisis, it stands to reason that 
the crisis should not be the sole perpetrator to the low rates. In the next section we will examine 
whether if we can determine if there is an underlying reason that the interest rates have been 
declining. 
4.2. Cause analysis 
Here we will examine whether there were noticeable changes in the investment or savings over 
GDP ratios during low interest rate periods after 1960, which would give wind to either secular 
stagnation or savings glut hypotheses respectively. Though the main period of interest is the 
latest bout of low interest rates, the 1970’s provide a contrasting case where data is available. 
Investment 
A systematic drop in investment would mean that most countries are investing less now than 
previously, leading to a lower equilibrium real rate, and a shift of the IS curve to left. Tables 8a 
and 8b compares the means of Investment over GDP ratio with from 1961 to 2014 with those 
experienced during the low interest rate periods in each country of the wide data sample. 
During the 1970’s most countries that experienced lower real interest rates also tended to invest 
to a higher degree during this time than otherwise. The notable exceptions are Australia and 
USA, whose investment ratio’s remained stable and Luxembourg which invested noticeably 
less. The result should primarily reflect that as, the periods of low real rates during this time 
were caused by inflation brought about by a large negative supply shock and expansive 
monetary policy, aggregate demand would have remained stable (and then gotten boosted by 
said monetary expansion) meaning that the incentive for investment should have been greater. 
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Table 8a: Investment/GDP ratio 1961-2014 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 27,94 1961-2014 26,25 1961-2014 22,74 1961-2014 21,97 1961-2014 22,47 1961-2014 25,13 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1972-1980 
27,88 
1973-1977 
30,18 
1973-1978 
27,53 
1974-1980 
24,78 
2008-2014 
19,71 
1972-1982 
30,09 
(0,08) (-3,48)*** (-6,19)*** (-5,38)*** (3,13)*** (-3,83)*** 
  
  
2010-2014 
23,25 
2010-2014 
23,09 
  
    
2008-2014 
22,25 
  (5,39)*** (-0,56)     (3,19)*** 
             
Country France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 22,39 1961-2014 24,08 1961-2014 20,89 1961-2014 20,65 1961-2014 18,97 1961-2014 21,20 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1973-1982 
25,57 
2010-2014 
19,45 
2003-2008 
24,96 
2000-2014 
21,80 
1971-1983 
26,58 
1973-1982 
25,15 
(-4,49)*** (7,31)*** (-2,49)** (-0,56) (-7,67)*** (-5,68)*** 
  
            
2000-2008 
26,33 
  
 
            (-7,17)***  
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, WDI 
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Table 8b: Investment/GDP ratio 1961-2014 
Country Japan South Korea Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 29,34 1961-2014 30,67 1961-2014 20,09 1961-2014 22,52 1961-2014 22,83 1961-2014 24,74 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1970-1978 
34,52 
2010-2014 
30,85 
1972-1977 
18,06 
1971-1978 
24,73 
1971-1984 
25,91 
1965-1983 
31,70 
(-4,38)*** 
(-
0,18) 
(1,88)* (-2,99)** (-2,94)*** (-6,02)*** 
2002-2013 
21,67 
  
  
2003-2007 
19,91 
2010-2014 
19,39 
  
  
2009-2014 
26,59 
(11,68)***   (0,29) (5,32)***   (-1,91)* 
      
2009-2013 
17,16   
  
    
      (4,02)***       
             
Country Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 24,28 1961-2014 22,05 1961-2014 23,70 1961-2014 26,70 1961-2014 19,94 1961-2014 22,50 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1970-1986 
28,37 
2002-2009 
23,25 
1971-1982 
27,62 
1965-1969 
32,10 
1970-1981 
22,95 
1973-1980 
23,22 
(-2,62)** 
(-
1,49) 
(-3,79)*** (-5,79)*** (-4,35)*** (-1,32) 
2001-2008 
24,44 
  
  
  
  
1980-1985 
29,90 
2008-2014 
16,72 
2005-2013 
20,30 
(-0,13)     (-2,86)*** (6,72)*** (2,88)** 
      
  
  
2004-2013 
24,42       
        (2,41)**       
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, WDI 
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By contrast, the latest episode has seen the majority of affected countries invest less than before. 
The list of exceptions is longer than last time this time around, with notable exceptions being 
Greece, Ireland, and Norway which invested more, as well as Belgium, Iceland, South Korea, 
Portugal and Spain whose investment ratios remained stable. Of note is that among these, all 
countries except for Belgium are countries which began experience low real interest rates well 
before the crisis, including the 4 of the PIIGS countries who because of their special restrictions 
imposed on them, had to endure high real rates during the crisis. 
Savings 
Like a decrease in investment, if a country has an increased savings rate it would all else equal 
mean shift of the IS curve to the left. Here we employ the same definition for savings as 
Eichengreen (2015) in that savings is defined as national savings and is the sum of investment 
and the current account balance. While it may be noted that the global aspect of savings glut 
hypothesis is lost when countries are judged individually, if go by the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, 
investment and savings ratios across countries do not appear to be wholly uncorrelated, 
something which should be case if we had completely free capital movements. A systematic 
increase in savings could still indicate the presence of a savings glut, and it should still 
contribute to raising the rate in their respective countries. 
Tables 9a and 9b compares the means of Savings over GDP ratio with from 1961 to 2014 with 
those experienced during the low interest rate periods in each country of the wide data sample. 
Due to shortfall in observable data some countries will lack observations completely. Few 
countries have enough observations that they stretch back to include the 1970’s, and among the 
five that do, France, UK and USA had a higher savings rate during their respective low real rate 
periods, while Finland and the Netherlands generally showed little change by comparison. 
During the periods of low interest rates starting in the 2000’s there is a fairly even split between 
countries that saved more and countries that saved less. Among the largest group of countries, 
those that increased savings we find Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, South Korea, 
Netherlands, Norway and Spain, while among those who saved less were Belgium, Finland, 
Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg (2009-2014), the UK and USA. Greece, Luxembourg (2003-2007), 
Portugal, and Switzerland didn’t see any particular changes in their savings rate. 
Summary 
Perhaps owing to the outlooks of their respective periods, the examined countries reacted very 
differently during 1970’s and during the latest bout of low interest rates with regards to 
Investment. Perhaps owing to the intact demand level, the increased rate of investment during 
the 1970’s may simply reflect firms acting opportunistically as the environment for investing 
grew more favorable. The low interest rates as of late have however seen mostly the opposite 
behavior as investment has dwindled following the Great Recession. A general decline in the 
investment rate would contribute to lower the equilibrium real rates. 
Savings rates changed in most countries during the latest low rate periods, and the changes   
have gone both ways with just a few more countries having increased their savings rates as 
those which decreased theirs. The results suggests saving behavior to have changed due to the 
crisis with few rates remaining stable, but it is difficult to show whether this clearly indicates a 
savings glut.  At the very least, those countries with a higher savings rate would have downward 
pressure on their equilibrium real rates.
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Tables 9a: Savings/GDP ratio 1961-2014 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
    1961-2014 0,25 1961-2014 0,26     1961-2014 0,23 1961-2014 0,26 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
  
  
2010-2014 
0,26 
2010-2014 
0,23 
  
  
2008-2014 
0,25 
1972-1982 
0,27 
  (-2,58)** (3,14)***   (-2,44)** (-1,68) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2008-2014 
0,23 
          (2,32)** 
             
Country France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 0,22 1961-2014 0,25 1961-2014 0,17 1961-2014 0,19 1961-2014 0,20     
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
1973-1982 
0,25 
2010-2014 
0,26 
2003-2008 
0,15 
2000-2014 
0,13 
2000-2008 
0,24 
  
  
(-4,78)*** (-2,38)** (0,59) (3,80)*** (-3,18)***   
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
          
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD, WDI 
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Tables 9b: Savings/GDP ratio 1961-2014 
Country Japan South Korea Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 0,32 1961-2014 0,32 1961-2014 0,30 1961-2014 0,26     1961-2014 0,31 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
2002-2013 
0,25 
2010-2014 
0,35 
2003-2007 
0,30 
1971-1978 
0,26 
  
  
2009-2014 
0,39 
(7,75)*** (-4,12)*** (-0,52) (-0,47)   (-5,58)*** 
  
  
  
  
2009-2013 
0,24 
2010-2014 
0,28 
  
  
  
  
    (5,79)*** (-4,34)***    
             
Country Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
High Rate 
Mean 
Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean Period Mean 
1961-2014 0,16 1961-2014 0,21     1961-2014 0,34 1961-2014 0,19 1961-2014 0,21 
Low 
Interest 
Rate 
Periods 
2001-2008 
0,15 
2002-2009 
0,23 
  
  
1980-1985 
0,33 
1970-1981 
0,23 
1973-1980 
0,23 
(0,75) (-2,32)**   (1,70) (-7,69)*** (-4,45)*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
2004-2013 
0,35 
2008-2014 
0,14 
2005-2013 
0,16 
      (-0,75) (6,06)*** (8,76)*** 
T-values for comparing means, assuming differing variances, included in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance by *** (P ≤ 0.01), ** (P ≤ 0.05) and * (P ≤ 0.1) 
Sources: IMF, OECD, WDI 
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5. Conclusion 
The current period low interest rates shares some superficial features with past episodes but 
also stands apart from them in several regards. In real terms, the current spell of low interest 
rates has not been the longest, nor has it been the most severe case ever experienced. For many 
countries the most severe cases of low rates came in particular with the Second World War, and 
the length of the period of low real rates following this surpasses the current bout for many 
countries. That many countries are all experiencing low real rates at the same time is also not 
unusual. 
The current period however stands apart from past episodes, however, in that those past 
episodes were almost always accompanied by increased rates of inflation, while instead the 
latest bout of low rates appears to be the result of low nominal interest rates alone for most 
countries, with many countries actually having notably lower rates of inflation compared to 
their long-term averages. 
For many countries the latest bout of low real rates came on the heels of the Great Recession, 
but as noted, the rates in many countries had begun to grow low well before then, suggesting 
that crisis alone is not the ultimate catalyst of the low rates. Of course, whether there exists 
additional underlying problems driving the interest rate down or not, the crisis-triggered 
recession still exacerbated the state of low rates, as central banks across the globe slashed 
nominal interest rates as part of crisis management. 
Can the underlying reason interest rates has been lowered be drawn to secular stagnation or a 
savings glut? It remains difficult to say one way or the other, historically there appears to be no 
period of low interest rates that either theory apply neatly to, but neither does the current bout 
resemble past, and both theories can account for what we’re seeing now. 
As such the findings do not conclusive point in any one direction as to what is the cause of the 
of the low rates of interest, but even so in many countries investment has weakened, savings 
has increased and policy rates were lowered to their limits since the crisis, all of which would 
contribute to lower real interest rates even in the absence of inflation. Also, both Bernanke and 
Summers posit the possibility that the current natural equilibrium rate compatible with full 
employment could be negative, and because of the low rate of inflation, it is possible that the 
real rate achieved falls short of this. 
Finally, the economy is not the same animal today that it was it was a hundred or even thirty 
years ago. While it goes beyond the scope of this essay to examine how the different makeup 
of the economies would have reacted to their circumstances in each case, I will offer some 
conjecture on the differences of the latest periods. 
The Great Inflation of the 1970’s is the most readily comparable period of lower real rates to 
the current one. Both were cases in which we had low interest rates amidst expansive monetary 
policy. In the 1970’s expansive monetary policy was employed in response to the negative 
supply shock caused by the mounting oil prices. The result was inflation rates spiraling out of 
control. “Too much money chasing too few goods.” In 2008 unprecedented levels of monetary 
policy was employed to combat the worst economic recession in recent memory. Yet the 
monetary expansion this time around failed to create any noteworthy increase in inflation, with 
instead many countries experiencing lower inflation. Why? 
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One explanation should lie in the absence of a supply shock in the latter case. Another could be 
perhaps be found in that during the 1970’s most economies still had extensive capital controls. 
By contrast, by the time of the Great Recession, most capital controls had been liberalized 
allowing for asset prices rather than CPI to absorb the effects of the monetary expansions. 
References 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2005), “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit.” 
speech delivered at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, 
Va., March 10. 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2007), “Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects”, speech 
delivered at the Bundesbank Lecture, Berlin, Germany, September 11. 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2015a), “Why are interest rates so low?” 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/03/30-why-interest-rates-so-low 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2015b), “Why are interest rates so low, part 3: The Global Savings Glut”, 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/04/01-why-interest-rates-low-
global-savings-glut 
Bernanke, Ben S., Bertaut, Carol, DeMarco, Laurie P., and Kamin, Steve (2011), 
“International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007”, 
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 1014, February 2011. 
BIS (2015) “85th Annual Report 1 April 2014–31 March 2015” 
www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2015e.htm 
Blanchard, Oliver J., Furceri, Davide and Pescatori, Andrea (2014), “Secular stagnation: A 
review of the issues.” In Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, edited by Coen 
Teulings and Richard Baldwin, pp. 101–101. London: CEPR Press. 
Bordo, Michael D., and Jonung, Lars (2001) “A Return to the Convertibility Principle? 
Monetary and Fiscal Regimes in Historical Perspective: The International Evidence” in 
Monetary Theory and Policy Experience edited by Axel Leijonhufvud, International 
Economic Association, Conference volume No. 132, Chapter 8. Baringstroke, UK and New 
York, USA. 
Catão, Luis and Mackenzie, George A. (2006), “Perspectives on Low Global Interest Rates”, 
IMF Working Paper 06/76. 
Cerra, Valerie and Saxena, Sweta C. (2008), “Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic 
Recovery” American Economic Review 2008, 98:1, pp. 439–457. 
Economist, the (2013) “Six years of low interest rates in search of some growth” 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21575773-central-banks-have-cushioned-
developed-worlds-economy-difficult-period-they-have-yet 
Eichengreen, Barry (2014), “Secular stagnation: A review of the issues.” in Secular 
Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, edited by Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin, pp. 41–
46. London: CEPR Press. 
32 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (2015), “Secular Stagnation: The Long View”, NBER Working Paper 
Series No. 20836. 
Hansen, Alvin (1939), “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth”, American 
Economic Review 29(1): 1–15. 
Gordon, Robert J. (2014), “The turtle’s progress: Secular stagnation meets the headwinds” In 
Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, edited by Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin, 
pp. 47–59. London: CEPR Press. 
Greenspan, Alan (2005), “Monetary Policy Report to the Congress”, statement before the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 16. 
Justiniano, Alejandro and Primiceri, Giorgio E. (2010), “Measuring the equilibrium real 
interest rate”, Economic Perspectives Vol. 34, No. 1, 2010. 
Kliesen Kevin L. (2010), “Low Interest Rates Have Benefits ... and Costs” 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/inside-the-vault/spring-2011/low-interest-rates-have-
benefits-and-costs 
Krugman, Paul (1998), “It’s Baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(2), pp. 137-206. 
Krugman, Paul (2014), “Four observations on secular stagnation.” In Secular Stagnation: 
Facts, Causes and Cures, edited by Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin, pp. 61–68. London: 
CEPR Press. 
Laubach, T., and Williams, John C. (2003), “Measuring the natural rate of interest,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85, No. 4, November, pp. 1063–1070. 
King, Mervyn and Low, David (2014), “Measuring the World Real Interest Rate”, NBER 
Working Paper Series No. 19887. 
Reinhart, Carmen, and Reinhart, Vincent (2015) “Financial Crises, Development, and Growth: 
A Long-term Perspective” The World Bank Economic Review 2015, pp. 1-24. 
Summers, Lawrence H. (2013), Speech at the IMF Fourteenth Annual Economic Conference, 
Washington, DC, 8 November. 
Summers, Lawrence H. (2014a), “Reflections on the New Secular Stagnation.” In Secular 
Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, edited by Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin, 27–40. 
London: CEPR Press. 
Summers, Lawrence H. (2014b), “US Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, 
and the Zero Lower Bound.” Business Economists, 49 (2): pp. 65–73. 
Summers, Lawrence H. (2015), “Demand Side Secular Stagnation” American Economic 
Review: Papers & Proceedings 2015, 105(5): pp. 60–65. 
 
